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11'~ THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK FUOCO and ANNA 
FUOCO, 
Appellants and Plaintiffs~ 
vs. 
BENJAMIN H. WILLIAMS and 
VER.NA V. WILLIAMS, 
Respondents and Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
No. 
9860 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appellants bought a parcel of land adjoining the 
property of the respondents on the west. The purchase 
was made in 1960 (R 85). Appellants caused their 
land to be surveyed and discovered that the respondents 
were occupying a strip approximately twenty feet wide 
along appellants' east boundary line. An action was 
brought by the appellants in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County to quiet title to the parcel in dispute. The 
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parcel is shown on Exhibit P-1 by the letters "ABCD." 
Appellants claim the boundary line of their property 
to be along a line indicated by the letters "CD." Re-
spondents claim that their boundary line runs west to 
the line "AB." An examination of the respondents' 
abstract reveals an error in the property description, 
dating back to 1950 when the respondents received 
the property for Mr. Williams' mother by deed. 
It is conceded by the respondents that the appel-
lants have record title to the parcel in dispute, but in 
answer to appellants' complaint, respondents alleged 
that the parcel belonged to them by virtue of acquies-
cence of prior owners for a period in excess of twenty-
five years. The matter was submitted to a jury and by 
virtue of their Special Verdict, the Court entered judg-
ment for the respondents from which the appellants 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Ben 'Villiams owns a tract of land 
located south of 39th South Street on the west side of 
Highland Dirve Street in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
The appellants, in the year 1960, purchased a parcel 
of land iinmediately west of the respondents' property 
(R 85). 'Villiams had been residing on his property 
with his parents since he was a child (R 53 and 54). 
Since the year 1934, "\Villimns has been cultivating and 
farn1ing the twenty foot strip in dispute (R 57 and 58). 
Prior to 1934, an irrigation ditch was dug between the 
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appellants' and respondents' properties for the purpose 
of irrigating the appellants' property. The respondents 
claim their property runs west from Highland Drive 
Street to the irrigation ditch dividing the properties 
in question and that the irrigation ditch was put on the 
property line dividing the two parcels and is still in 
existence (R. 58). They have continued to cultivate 
and use the disputed parcel since 1934. Appellants 
concede that the respondents had been using the parcel 
up to the location of the irrigation ditch. The only 
question to be decided by the jury was the location 
of the ditch in relation to the disputed parcel ( R 77 
and 78). That is, was the irrigation ditch located along 
Line All or Line CD? The jury, after hearing the 
evidence, was taken to the premises to view the same. 
By Special ·verdict, they found that the ditch forming 
the boundary line between the two parcels of land was 
located along the Line AB ( R 37) . Based upon the 
findings of the jury, the Court entered judgment for 
the respondents quieting title, by acquiescence, in the 
respondents to the disputed parcel (R. 41-43). 
At this point, respondents find it necessary to 
comment on the Statement of Facts presented in Ap-
pellants' Brief as they have taken statements out of 
context as shown by the Record. On Page 5 of their. 
Brief, they state that no title by acquiescence was proved 
unless it is proved by the testimony of Mr. Williams. 
While the case was being tried, the judge stated to 
counsel for all parties concerned that it appeared the 
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only question in dispute was how far west had Mr. Wil-
liams been farming; that is, where was the ditch located 
in relation to the disputed parcel. The Court stated: 
"Now, can we agree, gentlemen, then that the 
only dispute is where the fence-where the ditch 
was? Do you admit that he used up to the ditch? 
Mr. Skeen: Yes. The issue is where the ditch was. 
The Court: That is the only issue then, isn't it, 
where the ditch was. He admits that the gentle-
man cultivated to the ditch. You don't claim that 
he cultivated beyond that ditch, so the only issue 
is where the ditch was." (R 77 and 78). (Italics 
ours). 
Again on Page 7 of Appellants' Brief, appellants 
relate testimony concerning the change of position of 
a ditch, but fail to indicate that the ditch being dis-
cussed at that time and its location was the same ditch 
before it entered the disputed parcel. The ditch and 
fence referred to in testimony set forth therein on Page 
7 and 8 of Appellants' Brief concerns the location of 
the ditch while still on the north side of the road before 
it entered the disputed property and before it crossed 
under the road which extends along the north side of 
the properties. On Page 8 of Appellants' Brief, they 
state that the respondent leased what is now theFuoco 
property and for a number of years cultivated it and 
raised various crops on the property and irrigated the 
same from the ditch in question. It should be pointed 
out that the property once leased and cultivated is not 
the property in dispute. The property in dispute lies 
directly east of the property being referred to by 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appellants as having been previously under lease. The 
natural contour of the property of both appellants and 
respondents requires that irrigation commence from the 
east boundary of both properties with the water flowing 
in a westerly direction as the property slopes downhill 
to the west. This is pointed out on Page 11 of Appel-
lants' Brief where they state "A landowner 'could not 
irrigate up hill from a ditch.' ... " 
On Page 9, appellants further contend that the 
Court ruled as a matter of law that respondents had 
proved title by acquiescence. This is correct as far as 
the statement goes. The Court ruled that there was no 
dispute between the parties as to the fact that the 
respondents had cultivated and used the land to the 
east bank of the ditch. It was conceded by all parties 
that respondents had cultivated to the east edge of the 
irrigation ditch. The point in dispute was the location 
of the ditch ( R. 77 and 78) . 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENTS ESTABLISHED A 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF TITLE BY AC-
Ql~IESCENCE TO THE JURY. 
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POINT III 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT RENDERED 
BY THE JURY WAS NOT ERRONEOUS NOR 
SELF-CONTRADICTORY AND IS SUPPORT-
ED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENTS ESTABLISHED A 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
The record is clear that Mr. Williams occupied 
and used the property lying immediately east of the 
ditch bank for in excess of twenty-five (25) years (R 
57, 58, 77 and 78). Appellants admitted that this was 
so but claimed the location of the ditch was not along 
Line AB as contended by the respondents but, in fact, 
was along Line CD as shown on Exhibit P-1. 
Appellants' predecessors in title made no objec-
tion and it was assumed by others living in the area 
that the ditch in question constituted the boundary line 
between the two properties (R 57-58). One of appel-
lants' witnesses testified that the ditch in question ran 
along the east boundary of the appellants' property 
with lateral ditches running to the west. This witness 
was called by the appellants to establish the location 
of the old ditch. The witness states that the ditch was 
constructed along the east side of the appellants' prop-
erty for the purpose of irrigating the property and was 
placed along what was considered to be the east bound-
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ar:/ (R 114). Since the property of the parties slopes 
from the east to the west, it was assumed many years 
ago that the ditch in question was on the boundary line 
of the two properties. The ditch has been treated as a 
boundary line between the properties ever since it was 
constructed. It seems rather illogical that at the time 
the irrigation ditch was constructed it was not placed 
approximately twenty feet east of the position where 
it was actually located unless the property owners con-
sidered the boundary line to be where the ditch was 
located. The land at the time the ditch was constructed 
was primarily farmland. The feeder ditch or canal 
serving the appellants' property flowed from east to 
west to the northeast corner of the property. It would 
have been a simple matter to bring the ditch across the 
road from north to south at the actual record boundary 
to irrigate all of the tract if the boundary line were 
not considered to have been in the location as claimed 
by respondents. Appellants, on Page 12 of their Brief, 
again take testimony out of context by saying the ditch 
was done away with in 1954. Appellants' own witnesses 
stated that the ditch was used from at least 1935 to 
1960 (R 97, 98 and 113). Appellants' predecessors 
would certainly have brought the ditch along Line CD 
rather than Line AB, as shown on Exhibit P-1, if that 
js where the property owners claimed as the boundary 
line. It is not logical to say that appellants' predecessors, 
to be neighborly, allowed a twenty-foot strip of their 
farmland to lie east of the ditch where it could not be 
irrigated so that their neighbor could use the land. 
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An irrigation ditch can become a boundary line or 
monument if so treated. 8 Am. Jur. P. 748, Sec. 5. 
Certainly, a tree, creek, large stone, or even a dwelling 
or out-structure may or may not be planted on con-
structed for the purpose of establishing a boundary 
line, depending upon the intention of the parties. Where 
land is being used as farmland and is being served by 
irrigation water, it would be unwise, to say the least, 
for the owner of the land not to construct his irrigation 
ditch on what he treated as his property line, so that 
he would not lose the use of any of his property through 
lack of water. 
Again, on Page 12 of Appellants' Brief, they state 
that all of the witnesses located the ditch on Line CD 
of Exhibit P-1. This is not correct. ApP.ellants' wit-
ness, Owen Sander, located the ditch along Line AB 
by drawing a line with a dark pencil on Exhibit P-I 
down the north side of the road, then crossing the road 
to Point A on the Exhibit, then south to his property 
(R 113). Mr. Williams testified on cross-examination 
that the ditch ran down the north side of the road on 
the north of the property and then crossed the road 
to Point A as is indicated by an ink or ballpoint pen 
line drawn on the Exhibit P-1 by counsel for the ap-
pellants. 
On Page 13 of Appellants' Brief, they state that 
their witness, Frank Young, testified that the ditch 
in question crossed behind an old barn on the respond-
ents' property and that the respondents threw refuse, 
10 
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1nanure and apples between the barn and the ditch. 
This is another admission by appellants that respondents 
were, in fact, using the property as claimed. All of 
the disputed parcel lying south of the barn was put 
under cultivation by the respondents. 
Recognition of a boundary line by adjoining 
property owners may be shown by implication. Nunley 
t 1• Walker~ 13 Ut. 2d 105, 369 P.2d 117. The respond-
ents may acquire title by acquiescence if their use has 
been for a sufficient length of time. l(ing v. Fronk, 
14 Ut.2d 135, 378 P.2d 893; Nunley v. Walker~ supra; 
Affleck v. Morgan~ 12 Ut. 2d 200,364 P.2d 663; Hard-
ing v. Allen~ 10 Ut. 2d 370, 353 P.2d 911. 
It is respectfully pointed out to this Honorable 
Court that the appellants have conceded that respond-
ents were occupying and using all of the property from 
their east boundary west to the ditch in dispute. The 
only question of fact for the jury's determination was 
the actual location of the ditch in regard to the area 
in dispute on Exhibit P-1. This Honorable Court stated 
in the case of King v. Fronk~ supra, 
"Besides, a visible, persisting boundary having 
been shown over a long period of time is con-
vincing evidence of an intended or acquiesced-
in boundary. Under such circumstances~ it would 
seem that in the nature of things~ it is incumbent 
upon him who assails it to show by competent 
evidence that a boundary was not thus estab-
lished . ... n (Italics ours.) 
11 
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Whether or not respondents and appellants' prede-
cessors "mutually recognized" the ditch as a boundary 
between the parcels is amply demonstrated by their 
acquiescence in the ditch as a boundary line for in excess 
of twenty-five ( 25) years. It was only after the year 
1960 when the appellants purchased the property that 
this contest arose. The parcel has greatly changed in 
value from far1n land to commercial property adjoining 
a shopping center. 
Pursuant to agreement of the parties the Court 
correctly instructed the jury. The only issue of fact 
was the location of the old ditch. Appellants conceded 
that the respondents had cultivated and used all of 
their property down to the east bank of the ditch. They 
should not now be allowed to complain of their admis-
sion. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF TITLE BY AC-
QUIESCENCE TO THE JURY. 
Appellants agreed that the property was used as 
alleged by the respondents and that the only issue was 
the actual location of the ditch in dispute in regard to 
the lines AB and CD on Exhibit P-1. Appellants 
should not now be allowed to complain of the Court's 
ruling, which was previously agreed to by the1n. 
rrhe jury' after hearing the evidence, were taken 
12 
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to the property to view the ditch and the parcel in dis-
pute. After doing so, they return~d a verdict in favor 
of the respondents. The location of the ditch in regard 
to the disputed tract on the Exhibit P-1 was a question 
of fact to be determined by the jury and was resolved 
by then1 in favor of the respondents. Unless this Court 
can say as a matter of law that the jury's finding was 
erroneous, it should not be disturbed. After the parties 
had agreed that the only issue was the location of the 
ditch the Court properly instructed the jury on this 
issue of fact. The location of the ditch was either along 
Line AB, as claimed by the respondents, or Line CD, 
as claimed by the appellants. The trial court is not 
required to make findings of fact and enter the same 
where the facts are agreed upon by the parties. The 
trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on the 
issue of title by acquiescence when appellants agreed 
that it was no longer an issue. 
POINT III 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT RENDERED 
BY THE JURY WAS NOT ERRONEOUS NOR 
SELF-CONTRADICTORY AND IS SUPPORT-
ED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The jury's finding and the judgment based thereon 
was supported by the evidence and should not be dis-
turbed. Appellants continually attempt to persuade 
this Court that the respondents should have been re-
quired to prove a "mutual recognition" of a boundary 
13 
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line between the properties before respondents can 
obtain title by acquiescence. Mutual recognition of a 
boundary line may be shown by acquiescence over a 
long period of time. It is not incumbent upon the re-
spondents to show an agreement between themselves 
and appellants' predecessors in title in order to prevail. 
An implied recognition of a boundary line may be 
supplied by the passage of time. J(ing v. Fronk~ supra. 
Appellants co~plain of the Court's instruction on 
the location of the "original ditch." The record is clear 
that there is no dispute between the parties as to the 
number of ditches involved. It was agreed upon early 
in the trial that appellants claimed the old ditch to be 
located upon Line CD of Exhibit P-1. Respondents 
claimed the old ditch to be located along line AB of 
Exhibit P-1. 
The Court properly submitted to the jury for its 
finding the location of the ditch. They were taken to 
the property to view the premises in order to aid them 
in making their determination. It was admitted by 
all the parties that respondents had been cultivating 
up to the east bank of the old ditch, wherever it was 
located. The jury's finding that the ditch was just west 
of Line AB on Exhibit P-1 is consistent with the 
testimony and with the exhibit. 
Certainly, Line AB would not be as wide as the 
irrigation ditch. Line AB constituted the east bank 
of the ditch. The ditch would naturally have to lie west 
of Line 1\B. The Court properly instructed the jury 
14 
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that they could not find the east bank (of the ditch) 
to be west of Line AB. The jury did not find that the 
east bank of the ditch was west of Line AB, but merely 
that the ditch itself was west of Line AB. There is 
nothing inconsistent with this finding or with the Court's 
instructions. 
Attorney for appellants agreed with the Court and 
with counsel for respondents that the property line 
between the tracts owned by the respective parties was 
the east bank of the ditch which had been used to turn 
irrigation water upon the Fuoco property lying to the 
west of that ditch. There was no room for confusion 
as to the ditch mentioned by the Court. The jury and 
the Court viewed the premises and walked along the 
ditch running in a north-south direction immediately 
adjacent to the respondents' fence, which parallels the 
east side of said ditch. Maps in evidence showed the 
location of the fence and of that point, or line which 
is 295.02 feet due west of the center of the county road, 
Highland Drive. This is the ditch which appellant him-
self admitted was used to conduct water to his land. 
The locations of other ditches which carry water from 
the canal to this ditch line monument are involved in 
no way in establishing the boundary line between the 
properties. None are so located as to have any bearing 
upon the problem. 
If any confusion exists as to the exact surveyed 
location of the east bank of said ditch, it is cured and 
made unmistakably clear and precise by that descrip-
15 
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tion in the judgment which describes, with meticulous 
care, the legal or metes and bounds description of the 
properly found to be owned by respondents. This is the 
description of the property set forth in the warranty 
deed whereby the mother of the respondent Benjamin 
H. Williams conveyed this land to him in 1950, some 
years after her husband had died. It is the same tract 
occupied solely and claimed by respondents and the 
parents of the respondent Benjamin H. Williams for 
more than 30-more nearly 50-consecutive years. It 
is the tract upon which respondents have paid the taxes 
since the tract was conveyed in 1950 to them. The 
evidence is uncontradicted on these items, and the testi-
mony adduced at the trial was clear and unequivocal 
relating to the years of occupancy by respondents, and 
as to their said long years of tilling and caring for this 
tract as their own property to the exclusion of all 
persons. 
The appellants describe the land they had recently 
acquired lying to the west of respondents' tract by start-
ing at a different beginning point than that used by the 
mother of the said respondent in her 1950 deed to her 
son. The description used by appellant as having been 
described in the deed of conveyance to him from one 
Butterworth includes approximately twenty feet of the 
west end of respondents' tract. This, in no way, con-
fuses the location of the tract long occupied by re-
spondents, conveyed to them, and upon which they have 
paid the taxes for more than ten years. The description 
set forth in the judg1nent is exact and precise in the 
16 
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directions, distances and location of the respondents' 
land. 
The appellants have lived in this neighborhood 
for many years themselves and have owned and tilled 
the land adjacent on the south of the property they 
recently acquired from Butterworth. They knew of 
the sale ten or more years ago of the south part of the 
vVilliams' property to one Hansen (the north part of 
said tract was conveyed to respondents by the said deed 
of 1950), and knew that the west line of the tract claimed 
and occupied by Hansen had been tightly fenced by 
him since his acquisition of that part of the Williams 
property; that said fence was in dir~ct line with the 
fence constructed by respondents conveniently close to 
and on the east bank of the irrigation ditch of appel-
lants, which had been acquiesced in and recognized for 
nearly fifty years as the division line of these proper-
ties. Hansen had constructed a concrete wall and fence 
along the boundary of the property between the lot 
he had acquired from Williams' parents and that of 
respondents. This wall extended all the distance to the 
southwest corner of the land claimed by respondents, 
down to the said ditch on the line AB. The whole or 
former Williams tract, as it existed, before the south 
part thereof was sold to l-Iansen, had a common west 
boundary recognized all of these years. The ditch 
extends the entire distance of this old west line of the 
Williams property, and has done so for years. Appel-
lants had personal- knowledge, before they bought the 
tract to the west of the Williams tract from Butter-
17 
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worth, that this line had already existed for all the years 
they had lived in thee neighborhood. They tilled the 
land immediately south of the south side of the old 
Williams property. They did not intend to buy any 
land lying east of this line from Butterworth, but claim 
to find, after surveying out the description in the But-
terworth deed to them, that they had acquired twenty 
feet more than they had expected to acquire. They 
desire that the boundary line be changed and moved 
back to the east about twenty feet, after it has been 
used, acquiesced in, acknowledged, and recognized as 
the property line for nearly fifty years. 
CONCLUSION 
As the trial progressed, it became clear to the trial 
judge that there was but one issue of fact in dispute 
between the parties. That issue was the location, in 
regard to the disputed tract, of an irrigation ditch that 
had been serving the appellants' property for over 
twenty-five years. Appellants fail to present any evi-
dence refuting the respondents' claim to the land lying 
east of the ditch. Appellants maintain that the old 
ditch was no longer in the same location and that it had 
originally been located along Line CD of Exhibit P-1. 
the respondents maintain that the ditch, although per-
haps somewhat changed in appearance since its original 
construction, was still on the property in the same loca-
tion and was located along Line AB of Exhibit P-1. 
The respondent's tnother in deeding the property 
18 
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to the respondents included the disputed parcel when 
she conveyed to them in the year 1950. This conveyance 
is another indication that the respondents and their 
predecessors had considered and treated the irrigation 
ditch as being the boundary line between the parties' 
respective tracts of land. 
There was some testimony by various witnesses 
that the irrigation ditch had, in some respects, been 
changed before it got to the north boundary of the 
disputed parcel as the lane or street directly north of 
the property had been hard-surfaced. As a result, a 
pipe was placed underneath t~ roadbed rather than 
the wooden culvert that had previously been there, but 
the location of the ditch involved remained the same, at 
least from 1935 through 1960. This was testified to by 
one of appellants' witnesses, Harry L. Bost (R 97 and 
98). 
In the case of l(ing v. Fronk_, supra, this Honorable 
Court appropriately describes the motivating factor in 
the instant case when it stated 
"The rub comes when, after many years, land 
value appreciation tempts a test of the vulner-
ability of a claimed ancient boundary." 
Respondents respectfully submit that the judg-
ment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Milton A. Oman 
Attorney for Respondents 
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